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LABOR ARBITRATION: A DISSENTING ViEw. By Paul R. Hays. New

Haven: Yale University Press 1966. Pp. vii, 125. $4.50.
The argument of this small book may be briefly summarized: First,
the Supreme Court, having misread or inadequately comprehended the
writings of the late Dean Harry Shulman and of Professor Archibald
Cox, has adopted a romantic and, on the whole, inaccurate view of the
role of labor arbitration in the conduct of industrial relations, and has
wrongly elevated arbitration to its present preferred position in our
national labor policy. Second, only a "handful" of arbitrators possess,
"like Shulman and Cox," "the knowledge, training, skill, and character
to make them good judges and therefore good arbitrators"; the remainder, who decide "literally thousands of cases every year," are
"wholly unfitted for their jobs" and lack "the requisite knowledge,
training, skill, intelligence, and character."' Third, given this deplorable state of affairs, it is outrageous to expect federal and state judges
(all of whom presumably possess the "requisite knowledge, training,
skill, intelligence, and character" to decide the cases mishandled by
arbitrators) routinely to enforce either agreements to arbitrate or
awards rendered pursuant to such agreements. Finally, unless some
restraints are put upon the unfettered and grossly abused powers of
arbitrators under private collective agreements, the courts ought to
refuse to enforce either agreements to arbitrate or awards rendered
pursuant thereto. Alternatively, we might "set up in this country a
system of labor courts after the model which has been so successful in
countries like Germany, Sweden, and Denmark." 2
Conceding that his is "A Dissenting View," Judge Hays has nevertheless donned the armor of righteousness and has pursued his subject
"without fear and without research." His asseverations about the
"fatal shortcomings of arbitration as a system for the judicial administration of contract violations" are based largely "upon observation
during twenty-three years of very active practice in the area of arbitration and as an arbitrator, and upon the hints I pick up in the literature
here and there...

."'

The flaws of the system upon which he delights

to dwell-incompetent and corrupt arbitrators; collusive arrangements
between labor and management designed to hoodwink innocent workers; excessive delays; outrageous costs-are individually and collectively so reprehensible that one is compelled to wonder how professor1
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arbitrator Hays permitted himself to participate actively in this sordid
process for twenty-three years. Whether it was his elevation to the
place he now occupies on a distinguished court, or the Supreme Court's
ultimate act of folly in the Steelworkers Trilogy,4 or other causes that
turned him from the path of error we cannot know; but his rhetoric is
redolent of the moral fervor one associates with publicly repentant
sinners and reformed drunkards.
The book, presented originally in three Storrs Lectures at the Yale
Law School in 1964, consists of three chapters, dealing respectively
with the law, the practice, and the future of labor arbitration. The
chapter on the law is an accurate, lucid exposition which, although
critical of the Supreme Court decisions involving arbitration, demonstrates, nevertheless, that the lower courts retain and still exercise
limited powers to refuse to compel arbitration, absent an agreement
requiring it, or to deny enforcement of an award that plainly exceeds
the arbitrator's authority.
The chapter on practice is an ill-tempered, rather gossipy tirade,
replete with unwarranted inferences and unfair accusations supported
by references from relatively few sources and by quotations frequently
cited out of context. One example will suffice. Judge Hays cites an
article by this reviewer' as follows: 6
Aaron says that an "arbitrator may unduly prolong a hearing by failing to maintain decorum, by refusing to work more than a few hours a
day or by intruding persistently in the presentation of the case by the
respective parties," and that "some arbitrators take too much time or,
what is worse, charge for more time than they have spent."
The full context in which these statements were made is as follows :'
An arbitrator may unduly prolong a hearing by failing to maintain
decorum, by refusing to work more than a few hours a day or by intruding persistently in the presentation of the case by the respective parties.
These things do happen, but not very often; an arbitrator guilty of such
offenses is not likely to become overworked. In my experience most
delays are caused by the parties, and the principal reason is their failure
to agree in advance upon the precise issue to be decided and upon various
procedural details. Having checked with a number of my colleagues,
I find that most of us have on many occasions been forced to sit by for
'United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
Aaron, Labor Arbitration and Its Critics,10 LAB. L.J. 605, 610 (1959).

67.
Aaron, supra note 5, at 610.
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half a day or more while the parties sought to agree on the terms of a
submission or wrangled about time limits for filing of briefs or about the
use of a transcript....
It cannot be denied that some arbitrators take too much time or, what is
worse, charge for more time than they have spent. There is no excuse for
such practices, just as there is no place in the profession for those who
engage in them. Fortunately, the number of such offenders is relatively
small-much too small to explain some of the impracticable schemes that
have been suggested recently to restrain the alleged avarice of arbitrators.
Without doubt, there are dishonest and incompetent arbitrators,
just as there are dishonest and incompetent lawyers and judges. Few
would agree with Judge Hays' implicit conclusion, however, that the
overwhelming number of practicing arbitrators are knaves or fools;
and those who entertain honest doubts on this matter are not likely to
be edified by Judge Hays' disingenuous handling of the source material.
On the question of sources, Judge Hays deplores the "surprising
lack of objective factual studies" s about arbitration, and also the
"undiscriminating praise which has been heaped on labor arbitration
since World War II." The reason, he suggests, is that "few besides
arbitrators have made any attempt to evaluate the process,"' and he
urges "frank and thoughtful studies" written by the "clients" of arbitration 0°
These comments are among the most surprising in the book. First,
it is hardly remarkable that most books on arbitration are written by
arbitrators, just as most books on law and the judiciary are written by
legal scholars, judges, and lawyers-not by their "clients." In addition, Judge Hays appears not to have made even the most cursory
review of the literature of labor arbitration. Descriptive and statistical
studies, as well as critical articles, abound, and some of the most
outspoken attacks on both the system of labor arbitration and on
arbitrators themselves by their "clients" have been published in the
Annual Proceedings of the National Academy of Arbitrators. Indeed,
I know of no other group of specialists who seem to take such perverse delight as do arbitrators in examining their own real or imagined deficiences in private sessions and inviting criticism from others
in public meetings.
Judge Hays' two proposals for reform are both interesting; but the
8
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first is impracticable, to say the least, and the second is premature.
Prior to Lincoln Mills,1 a good argument could have been madeand was made by Harry Shulman-that the courts ought to keep hands
off the arbitration process.12 After all, if an employer or union has to
go to court to enforce either a promise by the other to arbitrate or an
award that both parties had previously agreed to accept as final and
binding, it is apparent that the arbitration function is not operating as
the parties presumably intended. It might be better, therefore, to
leave them to their own devices, the probability being that they will
either learn to make arbitration work or will resort to the strike and
the lockout to settle their disputes. Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers
Trilogy, however, rejected that suggestioi, and most representatives of
labor and management are apparently reasonably satisfied with the
result. Demands to "throw the rascals (i.e., the arbitrators) out" and
scrap the whole system are hardly an expression of the general will.
The second proposal-to set up a system of labor courts "which
have been so successful" in other countries-is followed by a footnoted
suggestion to "see" an article by Professors Russell A. Smith and
Dallas L. Jones.3 Because I was unaware that the labor court systems
in Germany, Sweden, and Denmark had been so successful, or that
they had received the imprimatur of these two authorities or other
American scholars, I checked the reference. What Smith and Jones
said was this:'14

But we seriously question whether the risk of improvident, unsound, or
insupportable decisions, either on issues of arbitral authority or on the
merits of the issue of contract interpretation or application-and such
risk there undoubtedly is-should be "remedied" through increased
availability of resort to the courts, at least as our judicial system is now
constructed in relation to such questions. Whether a separate set of
federal "labor courts" might be a more appropriate answer, perhaps even
to the exclusion of private arbitration as in some other countries, is a
different question which we will not explore here.
In a lengthy footnote following the above-quoted passage, the two
authors list a number of books and articles by European and American
authors on the "use of labor courts to decide contract interpretation
'Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).

' Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAav. L. R,v.
999, 1024 (1955).
Jones & Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MicH. L. REv., 1115 (1964).

11Id. at 1121-22.
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matters... in France, Germany, and some of the Scandinavian countries."' 5 The authors did not assert, nor is there any consensus reflected in the authorities cited in the footnote, that these courts have
been as successful as Judge Hays claims. Indeed, the task of critically
evaluating the experience with labor courts in these countries and its
relevance, if any, to the American scene remains to be done.
On the subject of work remaining to be done, it is important to
recognize that although Judge Hays has not convincingly documented
his attacks on arbitration and arbitrators, a substantial minority believes or suspects that there may be some factual basis for his position.
A more searching and objective inquiry into the arbitration process,
preferably by a research team including persons not immediately involved as arbitrators, could perform a useful public service. No responsible critic has responded to Judge Hays' polemic by questioning
his right to challenge the social utility of arbitration; just as no one
familiar with his distinguished career as a law teacher, scholar, and
jurist has doubted his qualifications to discuss the subject. What is
so disappointing about this unfortunate book is that it represents the
triumph of an unexplained rancor and irascibility over reason and
fairness.
Benjamin Aaron*

5

1 d. at 1122 n.11.

* Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of

California, Los Angeles; Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
A.B., 1937, Michigan; LL.B., 1940,
Sciences, Stanford, California (1966-1967).
Harvard. Member, Illinois Bar. Author, LEGAL STATUS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
RIGHTS UNDER PRIVATE PENSION PLANS (1961). Principal Editor, THE EMPLOYDIENT RELATION AND THE LAW (1957); Co-editor, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW

(2d ed. 1960).

